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“Who gets to speak and why?”: the poetics of oversharing in contemporary women’s writing 
 
This article asks how oversharing, the revelation of “too much” personal information, functions as 
an experimental literary practice in contemporary North American women’s writing. My argument 
follows two strands. First, I provide a brief history of oversharing as a cultural term and discuss how 
the label of oversharer is an “ideologically charged accusation” (Zimmer & Hoffman 2011, 181) that is 
primarily associated with women. Many critics argue that the identification and chastisement of 
internet users who share “too much” of themselves online reflects a wider discomfort with the 
increasingly blurred boundaries between web production and consumption, fiction and reality, and 
writers and readers in the digital age.i In the past decade, the development of social media has 
brought radical changes to interpersonal communication and this article focusses on an as-yet 
unexamined gender bias that underlies oversharing’s popularity as a contemporary term of 
condemnation. Namely, I argue that women are more likely to be accused of oversharing than men 
no matter what the content of their self-disclosures and through brief analysis of popular texts by 
Lena Dunham, Emily Gould, and Sheila Heti, contend that many mainstream writers are 
derogatively labelled as literary oversharers by their reviewers and critics. 
Rather than reject oversharing as a critical term, the second strand of this article turns away 
from the popularity of Dunham and Heti to ask whether experimental writing by women can 
embody a poetics of oversharing that is characterised by an excess of autobiographical, sexual, and 
embodied confessions.ii Through analysis of Chris Kraus’ I Love Dick (1997), the final part of this 
article asks to what extent oversharing constitutes a mode of dissent in contemporary culture and, 
if so, whether oversharing can ever transgress patriarchal norms. Western feminist discourses have 
long asked whether the exchange of speech or writing can, to quote Judith Butler, “be the occasion 
for a disruption of the social ontology of positionality” (Butler 1995, 441-442). In 1976, Hélène 
Cixous famously called for an écriture feminine (Cixous 1976, 875) which would create a form of 
women’s writing outside patriarchal discourse. However, five years later, Elaine Showalter criticised 
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Cixous’ search for a “wild zone” (Showalter 1981, 200) of female expression, countering that the 
search for an écriture feminine was a “playful abstraction” (201) from the real job of feminist 
criticism, which might otherwise account for the “double-voiced discourse” that women are forced 
to embody within a patriarchy. This article intersects and updates debates about feminism’s 
linguistic role, to ask whether oversharing confines women to disempowering modes of 
communication, what bell hooks describes as “a talk that was in itself a silence” (hooks 1988, 7), or 
whether it contains the means of a female and feminist liberation. Indeed, I argue that the female 
author’s divulgence of an excess of personal information is, as Anna Watkins Fisher writes of Kraus’ 
work, a fictional and “literary performance” (Watkins Fisher 2012, 224) that attempts to reverse 
“fears of women’s dependence and emotionality as points of feminine weakness” (233). Kraus’ 
experimental writing parodies the act of self-disclosure to a much greater extent than either Gould, 
Heti, or Dunham and, by doing so, this article reads Kraus’ novel as a reclamation of the right to 
share whatever and, perhaps most importantly, however much the female subject desires. 
 
 
The culture of oversharing 
Oversharing is a verb and the present participle of overshare. There is as yet no definition in the 
Oxford English Dictionary but by deconstructing the term, we can reach a definition from its 
component parts. The OED cites “to share” as far back as 1552. The earliest form of the verb means 
to cut into pieces, which by 1600 comes to mean the individual’s participation in an activity or 
feeling. To share means to perform, enjoy, or suffer something in common with others and, around 
the mid-seventeenth century, it becomes associated with giving something away. If we add “over” 
as a prefix, which in Old English means to exalt and by the fifteenth century means to master, to 
enlarge, or to recover from, it is possible to see how oversharing has the potential to carry both 
negative and positive connotations. Taken as an affirmative, oversharing means to master a 
participatory feeling: it is an almost transcendent act of performance, enjoyment, and/or suffering, 
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that is shared with or by others. Yet oversharing can also be understood as an act of self-
immolation, the cutting of oneself into parts followed by the distribution of these pieces as a grant 
or gift to others. 
Overshare became popular as a slang word in the late-1990s, when teenagers used the term 
as both a noun and a verb to describe a personal disclosure made in person. Many popular films 
and TV shows of the period reflect the term’s popularity. In a 1997 episode of Buffy the Vampire 
Slayer, one character uses overshare as a verb to make fun of her taciturn boyfriend: “If you haven’t 
noticed, he’s not exactly one to overshare” (Green 1997). Similarly, in the cheerleading comedy 
Bring It On (2000), a character uses overshare as a noun, referring to an excessive piece of 
information rather than a process or practice: “I didn’t need to hear that – that’s an overshare” 
(Reed 2000). Until the advent of social media in the late 2000s, the overshare was more commonly 
used as a noun that denoted a particular moment of indiscretion rather than a widespread social 
practice. The meaning of overshare began to change, however, at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century when journalists caught on to the term’s popularity amongst teenagers and noted an 
increased presence of the overshare in adult conversation. In 2000, columnist Bob Morris wrote the 
first of many articles to detail the rise of oversharing in the New York Times: 
 
Overshare isn't just a noun, it's also an accusation (a way of calling ''Foul!'') in a culture in 
which people don't know how to put the brakes on. It's [American singer] Carnie Wilson in 
Us Weekly discussing the stomach and intestinal surgery that cut her weight by 150 pounds, 
adding that after having her ''tummy tucked and boobs lifted'' she's going to have sex all the 
time. It's unsolicited lectures from friends on colonics. […] It's Kathleen Turner nude in The 
Graduate in London, and anything about The Vagina Monologues. (Morris ‘Don’t Spill It on 
Me’ 2000) 
 
 
Morris’ column evokes nostalgia for an unspecified time when people kept their mouths shut and 
their bodies covered. Importantly, he links a rise in the overshare to what Morris describes 
elsewhere as “this moment of pervasive reality TV and voyeuristic talk shows” (Morris ‘I Should Not 
Be a Camera’ 2000). Of similar importance is the article’s emphasis on the information sharing 
practices of women. Though Morris’ examples are not solely female, his expression of shock at the 
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naked bodies and plastic surgeries of famous women reflects how Western culture expects the 
upkeep of female beauty to remain hidden, even if they uphold socially imposed standards of 
beauty. Morris stops short of suggesting that the act of disclosing “too much” information is 
endemic in contemporary culture, but he is the one of the first to describe the overshare as a 
cultural phenomenon, indicative of a craze for reality television and symptom of a late 
postmodernist culture in which, he writes, “people don’t know how to put the brakes on.” 
Over the past decade, as social media has produced new and increasingly wide-reaching 
ways to share the details of our everyday experience and milestone life events, oversharing has 
increased in popularity as a cultural term. Indeed, the rise of oversharing in its twenty-first century 
context is indivisible from the implementation of “Web 2.0” (O’Reilly 2009) in the late 1990s and 
the subsequent development of websites that privilege user-generated content. The Internet was an 
initially passive form with few content creators; as Balachander Krishnamurthy and Graham 
Cormode suggest, the structure of “Web 1.0” was such that the “vast majority of users [were] simply 
acting as consumers of content” (Krishnamurthy and Cormode 2008). Moreover, the passive 
consumption of “Web 1.0” echoed previous developments in twentieth-century technology: 
Theodor Adorno famously denounced television for the psychological mechanism by which social 
actors “become blind and passive victims” (Adorno 1954, 176) and Mark Crispin Miller similarly 
argued that the “spectatorial” experience of TV is “passive, mesmeric, undiscriminating, and 
therefore not conducive to the refinement of critical faculties” (Miller 1988, 6). What is unique 
about the experience of Web 2.0 and the technological advances that enabled social media is a 
participatory ethos. Suddenly, as sociologist Ben Agger contends, Internet “[r]eaders become 
writers”, to such an extent that websites prioritising user-driven content can be considered “literary 
vehicles” (Agger 2012, 22) which emphasise interaction, participation, and collaboration between 
billions of potential co-authors and readers. 
The rise of social media and oversharing are, then, interlinked.iii Webster’s New World 
College Dictionary made overshare their ‘Word of the Year’ in 2008; Chambers Dictionary did the 
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same in 2014. Both announcements followed a dramatic rise in the number of people able to use 
social media. Originally conceived as a networking site for Ivy League students, Facebook changed 
its user agreement in 2006 so that anyone over the age of thirteen could join; micro-blogging site 
Twitter was launched in the same year. Both dictionaries therefore define oversharing as the act of 
divulging “inappropriate” amounts of personal information online. According to Webster’s: 
overshare is a new word for an old habit made astonishingly easy by modern technology. It 
is yet another product of digital advances that allow people to record and transmit their 
lives—in words, videos, and graphics—to anyone with Internet access, friend or foe. 
(Fontaine 2008) 
 
Tellingly, critics emphasise the idea that any “friend or foe” can access the personal data that users 
post via social media and accusations of oversharing are infused with a paternalism that warns the 
Internet users against revealing “too much” of themselves in public. This paternalism is a direct 
result of the mechanisms of the most popular social media platforms: sites like Facebook, Twitter, 
Tumblr, and Instagram allow and encourage users to reveal personal details to their online “friends” 
or “followers” through photo uploads, location trackers, and, most importantly, status updates. In 
Oversharing: Presentations of Self in the Digital Age (2012), Ben Agger criticises the “phenomenon” 
of oversharing for turning these otherwise “terrific literary vehicles” into sites of “banal chatter” 
(2012, xii). Agger speculates that users of social media “share more of their inner feelings, opinions 
and sexuality than they would in person” (2012, x) because the sharer cannot see the faces and 
immediate reactions of their audience. Similarly, literary critic Brian Boyd, who is widely known for 
his writing on evolution and cognition, claims that social media inhibits the conversational tells 
which evolved to keep self-disclosure in check. “Ordinarily,” he says, “in a social context, we get 
feedback from other people. They might roll their eyes to indicate they don’t want to hear so much 
about us. But online, you don’t have that” (Boyd 2013). Indeed, when a sharer posts an item online, 
its comments or “likes” will only reveal who directly responds to them; the sharer cannot know how 
many of their “friends” or “followers” read the post. Communications theorists Michael Zimmer and 
Anthony Hoffman call this aspect of online existence “diminished obscurity” (2011, 176) and state 
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that, prior to social media, the individual maintained some semblance of privacy because personal 
data was more difficult to collate. The voluntary and often habitual sharing of personal information 
online therefore threatens traditional, if socially constructed, divides between the individual’s 
public and private lives and highlights the threat to “contextual integrity” (Zimmer & Hoffman 2011, 
178) that the Internet represents to its critics. 
Today, oversharing is shorthand for a kind of narcissism and moral decay associated with 
the rise of social media. Articles diagnosing the contemporary “culture” of oversharing proliferate in 
Western publications. Since 2000, the New York Times has published 177 articles that reference 
oversharing; since 2005, the Washington Post has published 239; and between June and December 
2015, in only six months, The Guardian printed the term 741 times. Although the content of each 
article differs dramatically, the derogatory tone remains constant. In the second decade of the 
twenty-first century, oversharing is common parlance for what Zimmer and Hoffman define as “the 
divulgence of information excessive or inappropriate to a given context” (Zimmer and Hoffman 
2011, 180). The idea of “excessive” information sharing is important here. In a typical example, 
British journalist Zoe Williams disparages oversharing as “an American term for giving too much 
personal information - it derives from the enjoinment in therapy to "share one's feelings"” 
(Williams 2003). Similarly, US journalist Elizabeth Bernstein suggests “Blabbing Your Business” is 
on the increase “thanks to reality TV and social media sites, where it's perfectly normal for people 
to share every single detail of their lives, no matter how mundane or personal” (Bernstein 2013). Yet 
there is no common definition of what kinds of information constitute an overshare and each 
article that diagnoses oversharing as a contemporary social problem names wildly different 
examples. Indeed, I suspect that the receiver alone defines the overshare; that their boundaries 
dictate their reaction to a disclosure and these boundaries alter depending on their relationship 
with the sharer and the context of the sharing. That is, one person will receive criticism for sharing 
details of their sex life or bodily functions, another for stories about parenthood, childbirth, or 
childcare. Perhaps most surprisingly the mundane, as Bernstein writes, is a key trigger and people 
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who use social media as a record of their daily routine receive the most accusations. One study, led 
by psychologist S. A. Rains, suggests that “superficial disclosures” (Rains et al. 2011, 6) are a major 
factor in denigrating the quality of online friendships. If a friend shares a lot of “trivial” information 
on Facebook or Twitter, which Rains denotes as traditionally domestic realms like food, shopping, 
savings, and home furnishings, then the quality of their friendship will often deteriorate.iv 
Yet, it is more interesting to analyse oversharing’s use as a term of condemnation than to 
speculate whether online environments encourage and increase instances of oversharing. The 
negativity surrounding the term seems to be part of a wider attempt in Western culture to resolve 
some of the challenges that Internet-based communication systems present: not least the collapse 
of traditional divisions between private and public, offline and online, and reality and virtuality. 
Media theorist Russell W. Belk argues that online environments have a “disinhibition effect” (Belk 
2013, 484), which leads many users “to conclude that they are able to express their “true self” better 
online than they ever could in face-to-face contexts” (484).v Perhaps, then, if the Internet does 
increase the likelihood of personal indiscretion, it is because users gravitate to online platforms in 
order to share, explore, and expand on what they believe to be their “true” selves with relative 
anonymity. Accusations of oversharing run contrary to that desire, chastising those who share “too 
much” of themselves when they share any kind of information, be that sexual, bodily, or mundane, 
that falls outside societal and often, as this article argues, patriarchal norms. To label an expression 
an overshare and a person an oversharer is an effort to re-establish a context, to refocus the blurred 
lines of real and virtual identities, and posit the offending expression as inappropriate. It is an effort 
to normalize information sharing practices, particularly those conducted online, by assigning a 
label to modes of expression that are deemed to be excessive or somehow outside the norm. “What 
is this compulsion to share?” writes journalist Roger Cohen, “there is a new urge to behave as if life 
were some global high-school reunion at which everyone has taken some horrific tell-all drug” 
(Cohen 2012). Yet, as I argue here, it is a mistake to frame the “urge” to disclose personal 
information as a new compulsion, even if the ways by which we share rapidly evolve. 
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The gendered poetics of oversharing 
 
Figure 1: 'Thanks for not sharing', The Wall Street Journal (Source: Getty Images) 
Figure 2: ‘Why do people overshare online?’ BBC online (Source: Thinkstock) 
       
To state my point clearly, women are accused of oversharing more often than men.vi On a 
superficial level, every article diagnosing our “culture” of oversharing features a photo of a 
woman chatting or typing recklessly to a friend or disinterested male partner (see figures 1 and 
2). Just glancing over these pieces, published in the last few years by the New York Times, The 
Guardian, The Telegraph, The Wall Street Journal, and The Daily Mail, demonstrates that while 
oversharing is a new word, contemporary use of the term is steeped in all too familiar 
misogynies that privilege male subjectivity over female and characterise female self-
knowledge, and the public sharing of that knowledge, as transgressive. When we consider 
what oversharing is, the disclosure of personal information inappropriate to a given context, it 
is a term loaded against women who do not set the cultural context in which their disclosures 
are shared, received, and judged. In an extensive analysis of just one article on oversharing 
published in Women’s Health magazine, Jessica Butler suggests that criticisms of oversharing 
tend to centre on “traditionally female realms – children, food/cooking, the body, etc. – in a 
manner that upholds conservative ideals of femininity and disallows discussion of these arenas 
by suggesting that they are trivial and inconsequential” (Butler 2013, 14). Butler’s analysis 
recalls older arguments about women’s exclusion from the public sphere which, as historian 
Eileen Yeo argues, has “always been dangerous territory” for women “attempting self-
representation” (Yeo 1998, 1). Accusations of oversharing voice a concern that online self-
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disclosure diminishes the divide between private and public spheres but, to extend Yeo’s 
point, the gendered dimensions of the accusation are rooted in the idea that women should 
not “share” some sense of public citizenship. The relativity of the term oversharing remains 
key here, as does the idea that oversharers do not share “too much” information: they share 
material that the accuser believes to be either offensive or mundane. Indeed, I would venture 
that women are more often identified as oversharers than men because patriarchal culture 
deems the very fabric of their existence, at best, to be uninteresting and, at worst, 
insignificant. 
 A telling example of this gender bias is the critical response to a recent strand of 
autobiographical writing practiced by Lena Dunham, Emily Gould, and Sheila Heti. Reviewers 
and journalists often describe these writers as authorial oversharers and, in doing so, 
characterise the trend as evidence of a general female tendency to give away “too much” 
personal detail. Again, accusations of literary oversharing are part of a much longer discussion. 
In 1973, Erica Jong claimed that male reviewers used confessional as “a put-down” to women 
writers: “It implies that what these women are doing is just sort of spilling out whatever they 
have in their guts and that there's no craft involved in the writing." (Jong 1973, 66). Similarly, 
Kate Millett took exception to the frequency with which male critics describe women’s writing 
as “confessional”, since it implies “the acceptance of sin, an unnatural, wrong action for which 
the writer wishes atonement” (Millett 1975, 74). Twenty-first-century women writers are the 
subject of similar accusations when they write about their emotional, sexual, and daily lives 
and, according to journalist Tyler Coates, oversharing is already a well-seasoned literary term, 
usually reserved, he writes, for “female writers, particularly those whose personal essays are 
[seen] as self-indulgent, navel-gazing screeds” (Coates 2013). Indeed, the term seems 
engineered to undermine the creative process of women’s writing and to posit the work of 
women writers as the “spilling out” of content that Jong once associated with male definitions 
of confession. It is notable, then, that critics do not accuse male writers of oversharing with 
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the same regularity and that contemporary novelists like Ben Lerner, Tao Lin, and Karl Ove 
Knausgård, who write similarly autofictional accounts of their inner lives, bodies, and 
sexuality, are celebrated as contemporary incarnations of Proust when their female 
equivalents are regularly dismissed as unworthy of literary note.  
Lena Dunham is by far the best-known “literary oversharer” (Peck 2012) and first achieved 
notoriety in 2012 as writer, director, and star of the HBO TV series, Girls (2012-present). Girls 
exemplifies Dunham’s playfulness with fiction and autobiography: Dunham stars as the show’s 
twenty-four-year-old protagonist, Hannah Horvath, an aspiring writer and graduate of Dunham’s 
alma mater, Oberlin College. Since Girls’ debut, Dunham has been accused of “remorseless self-
exposure” (Freeman 2014) and of “oversharing” (Stanley 2014) the details of her life in the fictional 
world of the show. Some critics bemoan the emotional excesses of Dunham’s characters; others 
dislike Girls’ stark and graphic sex scenes. Time magazine reviewed an early episode in which 
Hannah is asked to write about going “outside her comfort zone” (Persky 2013). She proceeds, in the 
reviewer’s words, “to snort coke, expose herself publicly, and let down her friends. Where’s the 
human dignity?” (Persky 2013). Indeed, critics accuse Dunham of oversharing in part because of 
similarities between the writer and her onscreen character but also because of Dunham’s 
willingness to appear naked in what literary critic Alan Jacobs calls “extremely graphic” and 
“disturbing” (2013, 33) sex scenes. Repeated exposure to images of Dunham’s naked body, which, as 
her character declares in Girls, “has always been thirteen lbs overweight” (Dunham 2012), further 
confirms Dunham’s status as the “Queen” (Silman 2014; Karni 2015) of oversharing because her 
body type, love handles, and two or three rolls of fat are so rarely seen on famous women. The lack 
of “dignity” that Time then observes in Dunham and her character, Hannah, is a result of the same 
blurred lines that generate accusations of oversharing. That is to say, Dunham’s portrayal of a 
fictionalised version of herself deliberately elides traditional categories of fiction and nonfiction 
while Dunham’s stated “compulsion” to “expose” (Dunham 2015) herself onscreen falls outside 
existing social norms of how a woman should speak, act, and look with “dignity”. 
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For many, Dunham also heads a generation of “millennial” women writers who share the 
details of their personal lives in a form of autofiction that is heavily influenced by blogging and 
social media. These fictions are often read as open diaries; according to literary critic Minna 
Proctor, their authors seem more like “pathological oversharers with a weakness for literature” 
(Proctor 2014) than “serious” authors with a literary vision. One such writer, the American critic, 
publisher, and novelist Emily Gould, has also been credited with popularising oversharing as a 
contemporary term. In May 2008, six months before Webster’s made oversharing their word of the 
year, the New York Times published ‘Exposed’, Gould’s lengthy essay on blogging, online existence, 
and life as a female writer. The article was one of the first to debate the cultural meaning of 
oversharing and Gould conceives the term positively, noting the “strangest and most pleasurable 
aspects of personal blogs is just how intensely personal they can be” (Gould 2008). The subjectivity 
of oversharing is key to Gould’s argument. “Some people”, she writes: 
have always been more naturally inclined toward oversharing than others. Technology just 
enables us to overshare on a different scale. Long before I had a blog, I found ways to 
broadcast my thoughts — to gossip about myself, tell my own secrets, tell myself and others 
the ongoing story of my life. […] The big difference between these youthful indiscretions 
and my more recent ones is that you can Google my more recent ones. (Gould 2008) 
 
Gould’s essay both comments on and practices the act of oversharing. First, she recounts the thrill 
of sharing online and in person, admitting a love of receiving the personal disclosures of others. 
Second, the essay shares, and re-shares, the intimate details of her life: “I’m talking “specific details 
about someone’s S.T.D.’s” personal, “my infertility treatments” personal. There are 
nongynecological overshares, too: “My dog has cancer” overshares, “my abusive relationship” 
overshares.” (Gould 2008). Gould claims to love them all, though she doesn’t define oversharing as 
a new phenomenon but rather as a “First Amendment” right, inalienable and constitutional as an 
expression of every US citizen’s freedom of speech. By recapping and retelling current and previous 
indiscretions, ‘Exposed’ asserts Gould’s right to overshare, again and again, defining and pushing at 
the concept of oversharing in an unequivocal celebration of the term. 
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 ‘Exposed’ elicited more than 1,200 comments from New York Times readers, many of 
them dismissive of or disgusted by Gould’s prose.vii Indeed, the passion for oversharing that 
Gould explored in her blogging and nonfictional writing was so controversial that it marred 
reviews of her first novel, Friendship (2014), when it was published six years later. The 
influential New York Times’ reviewer Michiko Kakutani both chastised and defended Gould, 
describing her earlier online work as “often very irritating” (Kakutani 2014) but characterising 
Friendship as “keen-eyed” and more than the “simple spewing […] of an obsessive oversharer.” 
Canadian playwright and novelist Sheila Heti received similarly mixed reviews for her 
autofictional novel, How Should a Person Be? when the American edition was published in 
2012. Publicised under the provocative subtitle, a ‘Novel from Life,’ Heti’s debut focusses on a 
twenty-eight year old playwright named “Sheila” who spends her day-to-day existence asking 
questions about the nature of friendship, identity, and art. “I had spent so much time,” Sheila 
says in the novel, “trying to make the play I was writing – and my life, and my self – into an 
object of beauty. It was exhausting and all I knew” (Heti 2012, 13). Much like Dunham’s TV 
show, Heti’s novel features a protagonist who mines her personal life for artistic material. In 
Girls, Hannah falls out with the friends, boyfriends, and relatives she writes about; in How 
Should a Person Be?, Sheila argues with her best friend, Margaux, about Sheila’s lack of 
boundaries and, particularly, about the latter’s desire to tape their conversations and use 
transcripts in her writing. Consequently, reviewers characterise Heti’s novel as a symptom of 
the age of confession: “a reaction to the age of over-sharing” (Heti 2013), “a complicated twist 
on over-sharing” (McCormack 2012), and representative of art “in a time when over-sharing 
has become not only acceptable but expected” (Crum 2015). 
 Yet Heti’s narrative also “overshares” the intimate details of Sheila’s personal life. The text 
brims with references to her “dirty”, “slutty underwear” (Heti 2012, 58), to her literally “multicolored 
shit” (Heti 2012, 90), and detailed accounts of her sex life, including a narrative ‘Interlude for 
Fucking’ (Heti 2012, 117) in which Sheila repeatedly asks her partner to “cum in my mouth” and 
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“[d]on’t let me wash it out” (Heti 2012, 120). Dunham, Gould, and Heti all write about their 
protagonist’s sexual experiences, their bodies, desires, and fantasies; they do so repeatedly and 
incessantly, though they do not write as explicitly as their critics suppose. Indeed, novelist and 
critic Hannah Tennant-Moore counts Dunham and Heti within a “trend of young women 
portraying themselves through their mediocre sexual experiences” (Tennant-Moore 2014) and 
claims there is an innocence to their portrayals of sex and sexuality that could hardly be deemed 
explicit. Still, I argue that a common poetics links these authors, the art they create, and the art that 
their characters create within the text. Both Hannah and “Sheila” live with their “clothes off”, as 
Heti writes, and claim to disclose the private details of their lives “so the rest of us can know what it 
means to be human” (Heti 2012, 60). This is a lofty and somewhat naive ambition, but it is 
fundamental to the narrative of autofictional texts. How Should A Person Be? uses Heti’s life as 
material, relying on emails, transcripts, and the minute, even boring details of her “real” social life. 
These disclosures often seem to have no point, do little to advance the story, or enable 
characterisation but, despite the limitations of the narrative perspective occupied by Dunham, 
Heti, and Gould, who have been rightly criticised for the whiteness and straight-ness of their 
fiction’s world-view, narrowness seems rather to be the point. The everyday concerns of these 
writers are mundane and universal, everyday and explicit, but when articulated by contemporary 
North American women who write fictive and creative versions of themselves, they continue to 
transgress as critics diagnose their “navel-gazing screeds” (Coates 2013) as objects of ridicule and 
disgust. 
  
I Love Dick 
It is interesting to note that the “new” trend of literary oversharers headed by Dunham, Gould, 
and Heti coincides with a revival of critical interest in experimental women writers of the late 
1980s and 1990s. In her essay ‘How Soon Is Now: Constructing the Contemporary / Gendering 
the Experimental’ (2014), Rachel Carroll observes that the rise of second- and third-wave 
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feminist presses, “and their contribution to the construction of the canon of historic and 
contemporary women writers” (Carroll 2014, 8), has established an unprecedented audience 
for women’s writing. However, as Carroll also notes, the legacy of feminism’s “mainstream” 
cultural integration is littered with “problems and paradoxes” (Carroll 2014, 9) that have yet to 
be resolved. The exclusion of experimental women’s writing from mainstream publication is 
one such problem and is particularly telling of the ways in which Dunham, Gould, and Heti 
are categorised by their critics. That is, the sexual, bodily, and mundane indiscretions that 
make up the narrative dialogue and prose of Girls, ‘Exposed,’ and How Should A Person Be? are 
only radical within the narrow set of feminine ideals prescribed to twenty-first century 
women. Moreover, these texts are only experimental within the narrow range of women 
writers who achieve mainstream publication. Against the hostile climate of literary publishing, 
the poetics of oversharing outlined above is situated within a community of female writers 
who read, support, and publish other women. Dunham provided a blurb for How Should A 
Person Be?; Gould and Heti have appeared in conversation together and as part of roundtable 
discussions with their experimental foremothers, Lynne Tillman, Eileen Myles, and Chris 
Kraus. Importantly, Gould also established EmilyBooks in 2011, a project that “publishes, 
publicizes, and celebrates the best work of transgressive writers of the past, present and 
future” (Gould & Curry 2011), commissioning two original titles a year and republishing works 
by Renata Adler, Elena Ferrante, and Dodie Bellamy, amongst many others. 
Together, Dunham, Heti, and Gould have also helped raise the profile of Kraus’ debut 
novel, I Love Dick, the first edition of which acquired cult status in the art world when it was 
published in 1997 but was largely bypassed by literary circles. In 2006, a new edition of I Love 
Dick was released, selling 1,000 copies a year until 2012 when, as Gould writes in her review of 
the British edition, “the zeitgeist began to catch up” (Gould 2015). Gould’s review links the 
“influence” of I Love Dick to the mainstream successes of Dunham and Heti and suggests that 
2012 was a watershed moment for women’s writing, when “[p]op culture was celebrating art 
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made by or about “difficult” women” (Gould 2015). For her part, Kraus has also noted a sea-
change in the reception of women’s writing: she praises Dunham in interviews, lauds 
EmilyBooks for its engagement with her generation of women writers, and wrote a lengthy 
review of How Should A Person Be? that compares Heti’s use of “constructed reality” (Kraus 
2012) to her own autofictional style. In a 2014 essay for the Sydney Review of Books, Kraus 
considers her new-found, if still minor, popularity with a “new, largely female readership” 
(Kraus 2014). She suggests that a kind of grass roots, “ground up” feminism, made possible by 
the Internet and social media, enables contemporary women writers to bypass traditionally 
male-dominated routes to publication so that “the writer’s position and following” often 
outweighs the status of the imprint their work appears under. That is, while the Internet 
provides a venue for gendered accusations of oversharing, Kraus suggests that the same 
platforms enable women to form communities that share, discuss, and help create an 
autofictional literature that attends to the poetics of oversharing identified above. 
Kraus had achieved minor success as an American artist and filmmaker when she 
published I Love Dick in 1997. The text tells the story of Kraus’ protagonist, “Chris Kraus”, and 
her romantic and sexual infatuation with “Dick”, who critics have widely identified as British 
cultural theorist Dick Hebdige. The novel is largely epistolary in form, told through the letters 
that Chris and her then-husband, the French poststructuralist and publisher “Sylvère 
Lotringer”, write and occasionally send to Dick. Soon after meeting at a dinner party intended 
to establish the two men as collaborators, Dick becomes Chris’ “Conceptual Fuck” (Kraus 
2006, 21). She chooses to worship him as an object of desire and immerses herself in a “painful 
elemental state” (Kraus 2006, 27) of infatuation that ultimately facilitates a series of personal, 
literary, and critical revelations. Her letters to Dick are creative, confessional, and wide-
ranging, referencing the theories of Giles Deleuze and Jean Baudrillard, the art of Sophie Calle 
and Hannah Wilke, and the novels of Gustave Flaubert and Marcel Proust. Yet the main topic 
of the novel is always Kraus herself: her “real” life, career, and fading cultural status as the 
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“money-hustling hag” (Kraus 2006, 23) of a successful academic. I Love Dick is not, then, about 
Dick per se. The eponymous man is something of a Trojan horse, a false idol to whom the 
author directs the “overflow” of her “sexual chakra” (Kraus 2006, 130) and mounting feelings of 
abjection as both a female artist and a wife. Indeed, as Anna Watkins Fisher observes, Dick 
acts as a “blank patriarchal screen” (Watkins Fisher 2012, 226) onto whom Chris can project 
her desires and through whom the author dismantles her residual feelings of shame and 
humiliation as, over the course of the novel, she defines the terms of her intellectual and 
sexual embodiment. 
On the surface, then, I Love Dick is a fairly conventional epistolary novel of marriage 
and infidelity, that sees Kraus abandon both husband and lover for intellectual self-
actualisation. The first half of the book, titled ‘Scenes from a Marriage,’ is told in the third-
person and takes the form of a diary; Chris and Sylvère’s letters to Dick are nestled within the 
diary form as ‘Exhibits,’ a word that both alludes to the artistic praxis of the author and frames 
the letters as a kind of legal proof.viii Particularly in their first letters, Chris and Sylvère stress 
the “reality” of the text. “Dear Dick,” Sylvère begins, “It must be the desert wind that went to 
our heads that night or maybe the desire to fictionalize life a little bit” (Kraus 2006, 26). By 
asking Sylvère to write first, Chris forces her own hand, overcoming any residual 
“embarrassment” (Kraus 2006, 25) at her lust for Dick by putting herself in “this weird 
position” (Kraus 2006, 26) where she is forced to reclaim the expression of her own desire. 
Chris’ first letter to Dick then describes feelings of dejection as a result of the position she 
occupies and has, to some extent, put herself in. Yet it also points to the restricted paradigms 
of female authorship, with Chris already doomed to write “The Dumb Cunt’s Tale” (Kraus 
2006, 27) without an écriture feminine in which to do so. ‘Scenes from a Marriage’ documents 
Chris’ gradual realisation that she does not and perhaps cannot fit within the academic world 
Sylvère and Dick more comfortably inhabit. Because Chris “does not express herself in 
theoretical language, no one expects too much from her” (Kraus 2006, 3) and once she realizes 
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she will never be taken seriously as Sylvère’s “Plus-One” (Kraus 2006, 116), Chris’ collaboration 
with her husband comes to a dramatic end when she, abruptly, leaves him. 
The novel’s second half, ‘Every Letter is a Love Letter,’ is more experimental and, 
written largely in the first person, it recounts Chris’ active pursuit of Dick. This is where “the 
project” (Kraus 2006, 43) of the novel becomes “real”; where Chris transforms her “Conceptual 
Fuck” (Kraus 2006, 27) into the physical reality of a one-night stand with Dick and a more 
sustained, fragmented, and tangential vocalization of her intellectual process. It is also most 
obviously where Kraus employs oversharing as an experimental literary practice. I Love Dick 
consists of over two hundred confessional letters, two phone calls, and “one miserable fax” 
(Kraus 2006, 73). Each attempted interaction contains a litany of inappropriately divulged 
information: sexual, bodily, and mundane. Chris recounts details of the sex acts she performs 
with her husband and then with Dick, described with characteristic hyperbole and humour: 
“We have sex ‘til breathing feels like fucking” (Kraus 2006, 161). Chris also recounts elaborate 
fantasies about a life with Dick and makes detailed reference to her past, noting the abortions 
she had with Sylvère (Kraus 2006, 45) alongside symptoms of depression, anxiety, and Crohn’s 
disease, which she pointedly describes as a “hysteria of the organs” (Kraus 2006, 85). These 
confessions are all addressed to Dick who, from the beginning of their acquaintance, objects 
to Chris’ advances and the ways in which she expresses herself. As Watkins Fisher also argues, 
Chris’ letters are a “brutally public practice in forced voyeurism” (Watkins Fisher 2012, 227) 
and the most obvious grounds on which Kraus “overshares” is Dick’s continued rejection of 
their content. Common to all descriptions of the oversharer is the suggestion that their 
confessions are unwarranted and that the excess of information they offer about themselves 
threatens what Zimmer and Hoffman call the “contextual integrity” (Zimmer & Hoffman 2011, 
178) of contemporary information sharing practices. In much the same way, Kraus’ letters are 
insistent and repetitious, reprising and retelling the details of her stalled career, failing 
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marriage, and obsession with Dick long after the subject has expressed his discomfort with the 
project. 
Important to the poetics of oversharing outlined here, I Love Dick is an autofictional 
novel, a style practiced by Dunham, Gould, and Heti that combines autobiography, fiction, 
and theory. Joan Hawkins calls this aspect of Kraus’ work “theoretical fiction” (Hawkins 2006, 
263); she claims that I Love Dick is not so much a novel but a text “in which theory becomes an 
intrinsic part of the "plot," a mover and shaker in the fictional universe created by the author”. 
This aspect of Kraus’ fiction is also neglected by critics, who tend to read the autobiographical 
above all else. Yet Kraus continually points to the fictionality of I Love Dick and the novel is 
deeply intertextual, with older novels of marital discord and infidelity its primary literary 
allusions. Both Chris and Sylvère directly reference and briefly embody the characters of 
Flaubert’s Madame Bovary (1856), a text that established adultery as one of the defining motifs 
of the modern novel, when they sign a letter as “Charles and Emma” (Kraus 2006, 88). The 
reference is at once a literary exercise, an ironic intertext, and a form of sexual role-play when 
Chris playfully notes that “sex with Charles did not replace Dick for Emma” (Kraus 2006, 113). 
Elsewhere, Chris refers to Dick as characters in Edith Wharton’s Ethan Frome (1911) and, most 
significantly, Henry James’ The Golden Bowl (1904), a text that portrays similarly tangled 
marital relationships defined by adultery. These references speak to the strikingly traditional 
marriage plot at the centre of I Love Dick, but they also convey the literary sophistication of 
the novel’s central characters who are, Chris claims, “among the five most well-read people 
they each knew” (Kraus 2006, 32). Indeed, I Love Dick is an auto- and metafictional play on the 
realist novel and when Chris and Sylvère become “Emma” and “Charles”, they write 
themselves into a literary tradition where their “Billets Doux; Billets Dick” (Kraus 2006, 70) 
mark the text’s linguistic play as well as its literariness. 
Kraus’ autofictional style also highlights the performative nature of personal 
information sharing. The lives and work of a number of women artists and academics are 
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interwoven with the plot of I Love Dick, situating Kraus within what Rachel Carroll describes 
as a lineage of marginalised artists who have “worked with their own lived experience as 
creative subject matter” (Carroll 2015, 11). The art and writing of Kathy Acker, Simone Weil, 
and Hannah Wilke provides Kraus with a space to reflect on the relationship between fame 
and femininity, the private and the public. Quoting Wilke, Chris asks fundamental questions 
about the position of female artists and their failure to produce enduring works of art: “If 
women have failed to make ‘universal’ art because we’re trapped within the ‘personal,’ why not 
universalize the ‘personal’ and make it the subject of our art?” (Kraus 2006, 211, emphasis in the 
original). Kraus’ quotations establish precedence; her experience of marginality is not the 
outlier but the norm. They also give voice to what Chris asks tentatively, at first, but 
articulates with increasing intensity throughout I Love Dick: “Who gets to speak and why?” 
(Kraus 2006, 146). Indeed, Kraus asks this question in a number of different voices and 
personae, quoting and analysing the work of the writers and artists she admires and adopting 
alternate names, both real and fictional: “Chris”, “Emma”, the “Dumb Cunt” (Kraus 2006, 27), 
“The Wicked Witch of the East” (Kraus 2006, 90). The narrative voice of I Love Dick is, to 
quote Foucault, an “alter ego whose distance from the author varies throughout the text” 
(Foucault 1969, 215) and Kraus continually points to the multiplicity and fictionality of her 
constructed authorial self. In doing so, I Love Dick mobilises the act of confession as a 
challenge to the patriarchal abjection of women, nakedly presenting the double bind in which 
women’s artistry is seen as too “personal” and therefore insignificant. Kraus overshares the 
details of her own life whilst also documenting an alternate Western female tradition in which 
sharing personal information to the point of excess functions as an undervalued artistic and 
literary practice. 
The complex negotiation of author and autobiography that occurs in I Love Dick 
continues throughout Kraus’ work, which largely defies generic boundaries and 
classifications.ix Amongst other works of non-fiction and criticism, Kraus has published four 
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autofictional novels, all of which cover similar narrative ground: a woman’s frustrated art 
career, her childless and unhappy marriage, and her gradual exploration of intellectual 
ambition and sexual desire. In I Love Dick and its prequel, Aliens and Anorexia (2000), the 
artist protagonist is “Chris Kraus”, though in Torpor (2007) she is “Sylvie” and in Summer of 
Hate (2014) she is “Catt”.x As essayist Leslie Jamison notes: 
 
[Kraus’] books return to the same dynamics over and over—romantic abjection, 
ambiguous and often frustrating intimacies, artistic devotion and ambition, social 
communion and alienation—in order to explore them in multiple and overlapping 
contexts: artistic, spiritual, domestic, private, public, historical, political, economic. 
(Jamison 2015) 
 
 
To my mind, I Love Dick shares the details of Kraus’ personal life, her sexual encounters, 
bodily ailments, and domestic routines in order to cross similar contextual boundaries. By 
revealing “too much” of herself, through a number of narrative personae and positions, Kraus 
saturates the novel with her own “reality” and, through her autofictional style, transforms an 
instance of “real” personal distress into a public work of art. Even as Kraus imbues female 
narrators with her own biographical details, she injects enough fiction to unsettle any reader's 
attempt to identify them as Chris Kraus proper. Just as “Dick” is neither Dick Hebdige nor, 
really, the subject of I Love Dick, so “Chris” is not Chris Kraus but a number of the contexts the 
author inhabits, the impressions she leaves, and the personal details she chooses to share. In 
her foreword to I Love Dick, poet Eileen Myles describes Kraus as a feminist pioneer, 
“marching boldly into self-abasement and self-advertisement” (Myles 2006, 13). But rather 
than write a memoir of “self-abasement” which would, in a sense, be “truer” than the events 
presented in her novel, Kraus translates her real-life obsession with Dick into fiction, writing a 
“Novel from Life” to borrow Heti’s tagline, in which the text’s fictionality continually reframes 
questions about the author and their authority, fiction and reality, and the creative difference 
between sharing and oversharing. 
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The relationship between Chris and Dick must be conceived in similar terms. When 
Chris and Dick finally sleep together, she tells him that their relationship is “eighty percent” 
(Kraus 2006, 163) fiction but asks Dick if that fantasy cannot be based in “something real […] in 
empathy, in intuition”. Dick, however, sees Chris’ project as more criminal than creative. 
“[Y]ou project this shit all over me,” he responds, “you kidnap me, you stalk me, invade me 
with your games, and I don’t want it! I think you’re evil and psychotic!” (Kraus 2006, 163). Dick 
interprets Chris’ project as an affront to his life and “privacy” (Kraus 2006, 242). Despite the 
fact that he sleeps with her, Dick does not believe Chris’ letters are an exploration and 
projection of her selfhood but a product of a psychosis designed to humiliate him personally. 
The end of the novel reiterates Dick’s position. When ‘Dick Writes Back’, he sends two letters 
to Chris, one addressed to her and the other to Sylvère. Only Sylvère’s letter contains a formal 
response; Chris’ envelope contains a photocopy of Dick’s letter to her now-estranged husband, 
in which he repeatedly misspells her name and repeats his “discomfort” at “being the 
unwitting object … of some bizarre game” (Kraus 2006, 260). “I do not share your conviction”, 
he writes to Sylvère, “that my right to privacy has to be sacrificed for the sake of [Chris’] 
talent” (Kraus 2006, 260). In so doing, Dick misses the point of the exercise: Chris’ letters were 
never meant to “share” anything with him, but rather to perform and even to parody the act of 
sharing itself. Throughout I Love Dick, in over two hundred letters, Chris meditates on her life 
and marriage, confesses her sexual fantasies, and documents her bodily functions. However, 
through the revelation of all this personal detail, she emerges as a writer and theorist with the 
confidence to claim she is “inventing a new genre” (Kraus 2006, 137). Dick’s dismissal of Chris 
and his refusal to respond to her personally reveals what she has suspected all along: that as 
long as she is married to a more successful “Plus-One” (Kraus 2006, 116) she will be conceived 
as Sylvère’s wife rather than an artist or writer in her own right. For Chris, the act of 
oversharing is therefore the act of writing herself into existence, of forcing a creative praxis 
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from the mundanity of her life, and reclaiming what she describes as an “active, public ‘I’” 
(Kraus 2014) that might speak beyond the personal to a female universal.xi 
Most importantly, and as this article has argued, Kraus’ commitment to “oversharing” 
the routine abjections of her life in the mid-1990s anticipates the many ways in which women 
are interrogated and shamed for the online expression of their subjectivity. I Love Dick is 
composed of letters, phone calls, and a single fax and yet the novel critiques the ever present 
gender bias that deems male sharing to be the norm that female sharing transgresses. In our 
contemporary “culture” of oversharing, where social media supports and encourages online 
self-disclosure but provides little indication of the context in which each disclosure is 
received, women are often accused of oversharing by those who believe their self-
representation represents a threat to the “contextual integrity” (Zimmer & Hoffman 2011, 178) 
that traditionally divided public and private spheres. What Leslie Jamison describes as Kraus’ 
“abiding obsession with context” (Jamison 2015) can be read as a critique of contemporary 
information sharing practices which define sharing as the norm and oversharing as the 
abnormal. As I have argued, I Love Dick examines the creative difference between sharing and 
oversharing and, through a number of narrative personae, Kraus performs the confessional 
equivalent of an informational striptease, performing and projecting a consistent lack of 
dignity, composure, and, above all, a refusal to withhold that which society deems to be 
inappropriate. The creative difference, then, between sharing and oversharing is ultimately 
defined by the sharer’s disregard for the receiver’s boundaries, for the highly subjective scale 
on which each individual decides when another has shared “too much.” And, in this way, 
Kraus’ text also suggests to the reader that oversharing can a politically powerful mode of 
expression, an experimental feminist praxis, and a minor act of resistance within a 
contemporary American culture that continues to repress the sexual, bodily, and everyday 
lives of its female subjects. 
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i Oversharing is often conflated with the acronym TMI (Too Much Information), though the former’s 
flexibility has proven to be more popular. I refer to the latter - and its suggestion that the sharer has 
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 x Sylvère is alternately “Sylvère”, “Jerome”, and “Michele”; the couple’s rescue dog always Lily.  
 
 
xi Since the publication of I Love Dick, Kraus has distanced herself from what she calls the “reckless wild 
I” (Kraus 2012) of her debut. In an interview with Rhizome, Kraus suggests that her use of the first-
person came from inexperience as a writer: “When I wrote I Love Dick, I was a complete outsider, so it 
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of I Love Dick demonstrates the extent to which readers are attracted to Kraus’ “reckless” first-person; 
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